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Gabriele De Angelis
IFILNOVA, Faculdade de Ciências Sociais e Humanas, Universidade Nova, Lisbon, Portugal
ABSTRACT
The euro and sovereign debt crisis is both a conflict of political and
economic interests and a conflict of interpretations. Two narratives
struggle for hegemony in the European ideological imaginary. Each
calls for a different mode of crisis management, and each represents
a different vision of the single currency, European economic and
monetary policy, and European integration as a whole. Each
presents different theses on the origins and causes of the crisis, as
well as its solution. As important as it is to know which narrative
provides a correct interpretation of the crisis in macroeconomic
and monetary terms, both remain insufficient when it comes to
solving the political and ethical conundrum facing Eurozone
governance and the management of the sovereign debt crisis. In
fact, both paradigms mirror the economic and political interests
and legitimate ethical expectations from the standpoint of which
their proponents approach European integration. To understand
these expectations, it is therefore necessary to enquire into the
conditions of fairness that might allow for legitimate crisis
management. The paper attempts to do so while also presenting







euro and sovereign debt
crisis
Moral economics and economic nationalism: the pro-austerity narrative
Austerity politics rests on the idea that fiscal indiscipline –that is, excessive deficit and debt
– is the genuine cause of the crisis. The ‘budgetary indiscipline’ theory is sometimes articu-
lated in a (harshly expressed and surely oversimplified) version according to which some
members of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) continue to maintain a level of
expenditure not supported by their actual economic performances, baldly exploiting
the industriousness of their more disciplined partners (Kerber, 2012; see also Guérot,
2013) and leaving to the latter the task of achieving price stability.
Some commentators dress the question in anthropological terms, theorising about
different political and economic cultures of efficiency, public spending, tolerance for
deficit, etc. (Henkel, 2010; Richter, 2012) and claiming that the European peoples
display cultural differences so great as to make economic convergence impossible. A
more sophisticated version of the culturalist interpretation of the euro and sovereign
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debt crisis identifies a clash between the German ‘ordo-liberal’ vision of an ideally politics-
free management of the EMU and an ‘opportunistic’ attitude that bends EMU rules to pol-
itical convenience and the choices of its members. On the ordo-liberal view (van Esch,
2014, pp. 289–290; Young, 2014, pp. 279–280), the EMU should rest on justiciable criteria.
Ordo-liberal critics of the crisis’s management underscore the excessive flexibility with
which the common rules have been interpreted, as was the case when the Treaty’s ban
on bailouts, ex-Art. 125, was bypassed to help indebted countries (Joerges, 2012,
p. 1016). The motivation for avoiding bailouts is both ethical and political, and has only
indirectly to do with the strict financial sustainability of the euro system: EMU rules are
designed to foster members’ individual responsibility for their own financial equilibrium,
instead of drawing off of their partners’ ‘fiscal virtue’. Bailouts undermine the moral incen-
tive to persevere on the virtuous path (or to first embark on it) and elicit deviation.
As a matter of fact, austerity is advocated at least as much for its disciplining political
effect as for its connection to actual economic theory. With that said, several supporters
of austerity also mention structural explanations for the fiscal indiscipline of some EMU
members: defective implementation of budget coordination generates the wrong incen-
tives for governments, thus inducing ‘weaker’ members to engage in budgetary disorder
and consequent free riding at the expense of the virtuous (Baimbridge, Burkitt, & Whyman,
2012). The EMU itself has watered down the incentives to foster international competitive-
ness that are usually set for national economies by currencies and interest rate fluctu-
ations. Weaker countries have therefore postponed urgent reforms (e.g. in the labour
market), and structural differences have consequently widened rather than narrowing
(Tilford, 2010, p. 3). Of note is the opinion of scholars from indebted countries who pay
tribute to the ordo-liberal view, acknowledging that the single currency has facilitated
capital flows to the point of concealing the need for weaker countries to undertake struc-
tural reforms, such as efficiency in the public sector, innovation in the private sector, and
welfare state sustainability (on Spain, see Pomés, 2012, p. 201).
A less generous interpretation charges indebted countries with the explicit intention of
free riding on others’ virtue in order to live ‘above their means’ via irresponsible deficit
spending (e.g. France, among others), by allowing salaries to grow far above increases
in productivity (Portugal and Greece), and by failing to redress inefficient fiscal systems
(Italy). On this line of interpretation, a negative balance of trade, which almost all European
partners have had over the years relative to Germany, is not the result of ‘rational’ econ-
omic behaviour dictated by given market conditions but an expression of collective ill will.
Were indebted partners less inflation friendly, their balance of trade would look better
(Kundnani, 2012).
Although the debate often drifts towards cheap psychology, the diatribe about crisis
management is not only about the emotional urge to discipline one’s neighbours or the
embarrassment of being in the same boat as ungoverned (or, to pick up the other side
of the cliché, overly rigid), ‘culturally different’ neighbours (Sarrazin, 2012a, 2012b) –
indeed, this is not even the main or most interesting part of it. In fact, the stability of
the common currency, in particular price and exchange rate stability, has been a
common concern from the start. This is due not least to the specific ordo-liberal interpret-
ation that has been given of the conditions under which the common currency would
have been successful. At the root of the idea of a common currency lies the notion that
the fiscal and budgetary effects of public legislation impact on the price of one’s own
2 G. D. ANGELIS
currency. Under a common currency, just as any country is ‘rewarded’ or ‘punished’ for its
public policies in terms of currency value, inflation, and interest rate stability, any EMU
member’s fiscal and budgetary behaviour impinges on other members’ stability terms.
However, since in the face of a plurality of EMU members the actions of any member
have diluted effects on currency and macroeconomic conditions, free riding with regard
to others’ budgetary virtues is an ongoing temptation. Although some authors are
ready to acknowledge that supposedly virtuous countries did not refrain from profiting
from their partners’ ‘lack of discipline’ (e.g. French and German banks with respect to
Greece’s excessive levels of public and private debt) (Kirsch, 2010), effective reciprocal
control over national budgetary behaviour – and therefore the acceptance of a corre-
sponding loss of budgetary sovereignty – is the linchpin of the common currency.
When the common budgetary rules are disrespected, the common currency’s stability is
endangered and the virtuous countries unfairly burdened with the consequences of
others’ failures. If members states’ economic and budgetary paths diverged and competi-
tiveness gaps grew instead of diminishing, this is due to the differing budgetary prefer-
ences of EMU members, which makes clear that the common rules and their faltering
implementation were not apt for preventing their respective governments’ inconsistent
behaviour. The fact that the ECB was called on to support states’ budgets – contrary to
its original task and intentions – is a threat to its independence and to the very logic of
the EMU. On this view, the Eurozone is not the place to exert European solidarity (the
Structural Funds must be sufficient for this), for the common currency is not supposed
to smooth out gaps of competitiveness, especially when competitive advantage is the
deserved reward of a country’s hard-fought virtue (Ohr, 2012, pp. 26–27).
In the light of these assumptions, austerity seems to be a means of fostering budgetary
equilibrium, external conditionality its most promising means of enforcement. The so-
called Troika’s direct control over the budgets of countries that have received financial
assistance and the European Commission’s preventive control over members’ budgetary
laws – to which must be added the continuous control exercised by the ECOFIN and
the Eurogroup – serve to bring national politics under the supervision of supposedly
neutral, ‘technical’ institutions, to the effect that the rules are implemented in the
absence of supposedly ‘opportunistic’ interference.
In sum, the pro-austerity narrative supports a consistent transfer of sovereignty in
matters of public budgeting in the name of the idea of an EMU, according to which
some members shoulder the entire responsibility for catching up with those who are
more competitive and virtuous. Since the fiscally virtuous countries need fewer fiscal
restraints than their less virtuous fellow members, both the transfer of sovereignty and
the required fiscal effort are also ultimately asymmetrical: they will weigh on some EMU
members to a far greater extent than others. The underlying conception is that the
EMU ought to leave the gaps in competitiveness between members unaltered. If the
common currency elicits macroeconomic convergence, this will happen indirectly –
through a country’s recognition of its defective competitiveness relative to its partners
and with the consequent individual effort to catch up – rather than directly, through
instruments that actually promote economic convergence (with the exception, of
course, of the Structural Funds). The political choice underlying this way of implementing
the common currency is evident: the EMU is not supposed to impinge on the means of
political influence and prestige among countries, which in Europe are mostly economic.
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In the context of this non-political conception of the EMU, political legitimacy does not
become an issue at all, or else the issue is resolved once the signatories have accepted
the common rules as part of an international agreement. Further democratic processes fol-
lowing ratification are not part of the game. On the contrary: the shifting political will of
sovereigns is precisely what must be kept at bay if fiscal discipline is to be secured in
the future.
A common currency without a common fiscal policy? The anti-austerity
narrative
Alongside the ‘moral(ist)’ interpretation of the sovereign debt crisis, a considerable
number (perhaps even the majority) of observers of European economic developments
have construed the crisis as having been set off by competitiveness gaps, which the
rules of the EMU sharpened substantially and which acted as a trigger for the financial
crisis of 2008–2009. Even prior to the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, critics warned
that relinquishing monetary sovereignty would make it more difficult for national econom-
ies to adapt to the common market (Godley, 1992/1997). In the international market, cur-
rency adjustments – or, wherever currency fluctuations are limited, interest rate
adjustments – are a mirror of different economic performances. Besides giving market
players and governments reliable information on how to react to changing market con-
ditions, they also allow for the progressive adjustment of national economies to evolving
gaps in competitiveness. Once currency values cease to be signals of economic perform-
ance under a regime of fixed currencies (or of a single currency), the only remaining means
for adjusting to changing market conditions are internal devaluation (i.e. the rise and fall of
salaries and prices), workforce migration, and public fiscal intervention. In the EMU,
however, fiscal intervention is limited by common budgetary rules. Since salaries and
prices are slower to adjust than currency values, GDP and employment are (at first)
those factors most affected by the changing economic environment. Competitiveness
gaps will result in declining GDP and spreading unemployment (Feldstein, 1992).
Of course, central banks also play an important role in influencing a country’s economic
performance. However, the ECB’s exclusive mandate to target inflation rates – recently
extended by Mario Draghi’s innovative (and politically welcome, though controversial)
interpretation of the Statute – and the inescapable rigidity that comes with having a
single discount rate for 19 countries with different internal inflation and employment
rates will not help to restore common market equilibrium.1 The theory of ‘optimum cur-
rency areas’ that lies behind the common currency (Mundell, 1961) therefore suggests
that in a regime of fixed exchange rates (or of a common currency, which amounts to
the same thing) the mobility of production factors (labour as much as capital) is just as
important as the flexibility of prices and salaries when it comes to the ability of the work-
force to pursue opportunities where production is growing and to leave areas of declining
production (Dinan, 2010, p. 88; Feldstein, 2010, p. 11). However, prices and salaries (them-
selves a component of prices) are in practice less responsive to market conditions than
currency values. Adaptation is therefore slower.2
Current hypotheses about the roots of the crisis therefore point to trade imbalances –
encouraged by inflation rate differentials – as being decisive.3 In the Eurozone, prices have
not in fact followed the competitiveness gap due both to the different inflationary impact
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of the ECB’s interest rate on the economic cycles of the member states and to national
economic choices (in particular, the wage restraints agreed on by German employers
and unions in the late 1990s) (De Grauwe, 2012, p. 176; ECB, 2005; Esser & Schroeder,
1999). While the nominal interest rate was of course the same for all EMU countries, the
real interest rates were low in countries with relatively higher growth and increased
inflationary risks (such as Spain) and high in countries with diminished growth and low
inflationary risks (such as Germany). This led to an influx of cheap capital and subsequent
speculation bubbles in the first case and to a further phase of lagging economic growth
(Arfara, 2012, p. 17) in the latter. The growth in GDP experienced by the former group
was largely illusory insofar as it rested on the dynamic of capital influx rather than
increases in productivity and efficiency.
In such a context, the absence of economic coordination between EMU member states
has crucial consequences. Indeed, as long as the increase in a country’s competitiveness
and ability to hold a positive balance of trade does not result in increased consumption
and rising inflation – which would help balance out the terms of trade in the long run –
it will lead, to the contrary, to augmented capital flows and subsequent financial
bubbles in less competitive countries. Bubbles have thus been the flip side of trade imbal-
ances and free capital flows in the euro area. Crisis-ridden countries have in fact been
characterised by relatively high inflation (due to constant capital influx rather than effec-
tive and sustainable growth). The ‘explosion’ of financial bubbles has therefore been the
actual trigger, but not the ‘deep cause’, of the euro and sovereign debt crisis.
To be sure, the financial trigger itself goes back to the in-built flaws of the EMU. When
recessions hit and deficit and debt figures begin to increase, investors foresee the hard-
ships likely faced by countries given the relative inflexibility of EMU rules and react with
a ‘sudden stop’, that is, by de-investing in them. The subsequent rise in interest rates
sets off a financial spiral (the same applies when market operators start guessing about
‘who’s next’). Again, not only were the EMU rules not apt for fending off this threat,4
but they put member states in a conflict of interest with one another insofar as the rise
of one’s interest rates signified a fall in the other’s (because investors saw the other as a
‘safe haven’ for investment). Contingent financial triggers to the side, however, the fact
remains that under the conditions of monetary union neither currency adjustments nor
discount rate fluctuations, and least of all a coordinated economic policy, were available
to balance out the diverging economic paths of EMU members.
Austerity –with all the social distress that follows from it – is in the endmerely a political
means of bringing about what free market mechanisms failed to achieve, that is, the adap-
tation of prices and salaries to productivity and inflation gaps. Reduced consumption and
sinking (or slowing) salaries are meant to restore the equilibrium of the balance of trade as
an alternative to (no longer possible) currency adjustments. The social costs are therefore
not mere side effects of austerity politics, but rather their central intended consequences.
In addition to its social costs, however, austerity has a number of further unintended
consequences. Adaptation through internal devaluation indeed increases a country’s
financial fragility: once prices drop, the real value of debt increases. Growing external com-
petitiveness, which is the ultimate aim of internal devaluation, is remarkably slow to sub-
stitute internal consumption. The depressed internal demand therefore results in a
declining overall GDP, which in the short term worsens both the deficit-to-GDP and the
debt-to-GDP ratios. Pressure on budgets will therefore continue, as we witness today
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both in countries that have been bailed out and in countries that have had a tough time
complying with the Maastricht criteria, such as Italy.
There is much evidence to support this vision of the causes of the crisis. First is the fact
that most crisis-ridden countries had relatively modest deficit-to-GDP and debt-to-GDP
ratios prior to 2009.5 Second, their balances of trade were negative in the previous
decade.6 Furthermore, each crisis-ridden country had its own specific weaknesses, and
each of them wound its own path into the crisis: those in which financial or real estate
bubbles were stronger suffered bank collapses, the cost of which, once the bubbles
exploded, was promptly socialised and turned into a budgetary crisis through governmen-
tal intervention. Those that had suffered from a slow but steady decline in competitiveness
and scarce economic growth, such as Italy, had to face market pressure on public debt
once the markets realised the euro-connected risks in the light of the course of austerity
steered by Europe (Busch, 2012, pp. 16–29; Enderlein, 2010).
In sum, the anti-austerity narrative effectively questions the core assumption of auster-
ity politics, which is the key role played by public debt, and points instead to private debt,
and especially external debt, as a consequence of massive capital influx. When it comes to
the root causes of the crisis beyond the 2008–2009 financial shock, international trade
imbalances – and their specific consequences under the current EMU structure – are
thus likely candidates. The easy objection that the crisis-ridden countries have deep
public sector inefficiencies and sometimes worryingly unbalanced public budgets – as
with Greece and Italy even before 2009 (although, again, the argument does not apply
to Spain or Portugal) – is not as strong an argument as it first seems, for an economic
area without productivity and price gaps is as unthinkable as a market economy
without inequality. The EMU must therefore have sufficient means to face these imbal-
ances (which does not prevent the euro partners from requiring members to pursue
well-balanced fiscal and budgetary policies and to improve public sector efficiency).
As follows from the above considerations, austerity politics is, for the time being, a
necessary consequence of the current design of the EMU (in particular because of its
focus on budget restraints and the absence of mechanisms to help its members absorb
asymmetric shocks) rather than an unalterable economic law. The Maastricht criteria ident-
ified price stability, budget sustainability, exchange, and interest rate stabilisation as the
basis on which convergence between EMU candidates was to be measured. This focus
on financial convergence put fiscal discipline at the very core of the monetary union
and ruled out internal redistribution as a means of redressing economic imbalances
among EMU members. It thus put the whole burden of maintaining or restoring internal
market equilibrium on internal adjustment (i.e. on devaluation, labour market deregula-
tion, and welfare cuts) (Lintner, 2000/2007), with the consequence that growing pressure
was put on the labour market (Dornbusch, 1996, p. 120). The indebted countries’ declining
GDPs and increased unemployment are therefore not mere side effects, but rather direct
and intended consequences of EMU rules. If this has thus far gone unnoticed, it is only
because of their lax application in the first decade of the common currency. It became
evident after the violation of the Treaty’s no bailout clause had to be politically balanced
with the tough austerity measures imposed on indebted countries.7
As divergent as the pro- and anti-austerity narratives appear at first sight, both reveal
the EMU as a political arrangement aimed to foster a specific, non-political vision of the
EMU, in which market mechanisms rather than common economic and welfare policies
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are called on to reflect EMU members’ economic performances, their relative wealth, and
their welfare standards. It is an arrangement with unequally distributed, high political and
social costs.
Intergovernmental crisis management and distributive conflicts
The current EMU financial rules impinge on the scope of action of its members’ executive
and legislative bodies such that key national tasks, such as labour market regulation,
welfare provision, overall taxation burden, public property and public property alienation
– in short: the amount and allocation of public expenditure in general – are at least sub-
stantially co-determined by organs that are not accountable to the direct addressees of
national policies. And yet it is the latter who carry the burden of all decisions taken in
this regard.
The current intergovernmental decision-making structure is unable to step in for the
loss of democratic control over key national policies. Indeed, the opposite is true: now
that Eurozone countries are split between lenders and borrowers, decision-making
involves a power gap between partners who face each other in the double role of (puta-
tive) cooperators and (de facto) unequal competitors for their share of the financial
resources (Habermas, 2015). Thus the current crisis (which the firm intervention of the
ECB can only offset temporarily) is indeed a crisis of interpretation – mainly involving
neo-liberal and Keynesian or neo-Keynesian economists, but with the significant partici-
pation of leading political figures, such as Schäuble (2010) and Padoan (Padoan & van
den Noord, 2012), and the European Commission under Barroso’s presidency (European
Commission 2011: 7; 2012: 2).
Beneath the ideological surface, however, there emerges the crudely ‘material’
dimension of the crisis and its management. In fact, Europeans are facing a crisis of
economic and political interests, primarily due to the fact that the EMU’s current rules
and governance structures divide its participants into lenders and borrowers, debt-
fraught and savings-investing countries, involving them in a neo-mercantilist fight
between export-oriented and import-‘prone’ economies.8 The precise distribution of
roles in this comedy at any given time depends on countries’ shifting positions relative
to others. While Sarkozy’s France was indeed on the ‘tough’ side at the time of the first
Greek bailout due to its lending position, it is decisively on the ‘lax’ side when it comes
to applying flexibility rules to the Commission’s scrutiny of national budgets. Countries
like Germany are more predictably on the tough side due to their clear-cut position as
exporters of both capital and goods – in addition to their supposed ‘culturally’
embedded savings culture.9
The current governance structure would be acceptable (at least to the extent that
output legitimacy is acceptable from a democratic standpoint) if decisions at the EMU
level were still substantially consensual and EMU members were to seriously attempt to
accommodate one another’s priorities, as occurred (although not without controversy)
in the case of Germany’s and France’s excessive deficits in 2003 (and as currently holds
at the insistence of France and Italy with regard to their current deficit-to-GDP ratios, as
regards its cyclical component).10
However, the crisis has decisively altered both the balance of power among EMU
members and the readiness of public opinion and governments to cooperate for the
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sake of each other’s legitimate needs and aspirations. The EMU’s substantially intergovern-
mental character has sharpened the conflict between discipline- and growth-oriented
Eurozone governments, that is, those who identify ‘market discipline’ (Hallerberg, 2010)
and strict rule implementation (Schäuble, 2010; Stark, 2010) as conditions for the sustain-
ability of the EMU, and therefore also for the political sustainability of the common cur-
rency, and those who instead locate the solution in economic growth at the expense of
a more flexible interpretation of the budgetary rules. The governments of bailed out
countries largely supported austerity politics, giving the impression that current legitimacy
mechanisms, still based on the domestic accountability of national governments, were suf-
ficient to ensure the legitimacy of the overall crisis management. Nevertheless, the
common currency poses a vast number of interrelated ethical and political challenges
that far transcend the simply technical matter of rule implementation and that raise
more general questions about the desirable level of economic and political integration
in a monetary union.
The common currency as a dilemma concerning legitimacy
The ethical questions at stake concern both the scope of democratic decision-making in
the Eurozone and the reciprocal moral duties of EMU partners. The current arrangement
reflects a double dilemma: on the one hand the rigidity of the rules reflects the need to
prevent free riding in the absence of a central rule-enforcement authority, while on the
other hand the domestic dimension of democracy in Europe compels political actors to
spell out European arrangements in terms of national visions and interests, and therefore
to assume a rather inflexible attitude in the conflict over the distribution of the costs of
convergence among EMU partners. Reciprocal scepticism and blindness to one another’s
needs and legitimate interests is the obvious result of this kind of political construction.
Moreover, inasmuch as the EMU is designed to bind partners to a definite set of rules, it
necessarily takes key decisions out of the hands of national institutions. At the same time,
it does not provide for a similar legitimate decision-making mechanism at the EU or EMU
level. The current mechanisms of euro governance therefore entail both a distributive con-
flict among the participants and an encompassing legitimacy deficit.11
Insofar as they have acted within the terms originally set up by the members, there is
little (to no) doubt that the EMU, its institutions, and the means they have taken from 2008
onwards to counter the sovereign debt crisis are formally and legally legitimate. Indeed, all
stipulations followed the contractual terms and formal rules freely agreed to from the
signing of the Maastricht Treaty onwards. Formal decision-making rules have never
been broken, and the treaties that established them have been properly ratified by
national parliaments, or in any case approved in the manner foreseen by the EMU
members’ national constitutions.
However, EMU rules impinge on the powers of national governments to such an extent,
and exert pressure on the national parliaments’ legislative activity to such a degree, that
their legitimacy must be reconsidered in the light of the European commitment to demo-
cratic decision-making. European citizens need to ask themselves which of the two is more
important: an intergovernmentally shaped Union built around international treaties that
take precedence over national democratic decision-making or democratic decision-
making itself, and how this might be spelled out on a European scale. In any case, the
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EMU ought to shift from the kind of justification appropriate to intergovernmental, inter-
national treaties to that which is required in democratic systems.
As long as the conflict between the intergovernmental and the national democratic
dimension of decision-making remains unresolved, there is the risk that any compro-
mise on the content of the rules or their implementation will only temporarily
appease the distributive conflict among member states, for the latter is built into the
political design of the EMU as it currently stands. As Weale (infra) has pointed out,
the EU – and in particular the EMU as a set of international agreements between
member states – is a compound polity in which member states are required to make
a credible commitment to comply with the terms of the inter-state contract. Member
states’ governments make commitments as representatives of their citizens, to which
they are accountable in a democratic framework. Their commitments must therefore
also be acceptable at the domestic level. This double commitment to European partners
and domestic constituencies may lead to conflicts between the international and the
domestic levels, thus undermining a government’s credibility in the eyes of its partners
or its acceptability to the domestic constituency. The latter is especially true since in
European matters domestic legitimacy is by and large ‘output legitimacy’ insofar as it
is tied up with the overall advantages of the international contract. The will of the
national sovereign is thus likely to be in conflict with the inter-state rules to the
extent that the latter are no longer able to secure a clear win–win situation for all par-
ticipants in the contract. Moreover, since the inter-state contract severely limits the
scope of action of all participating governments, the latter find themselves bound to
rules that neither secure the well-being expected by citizens when they joined the con-
tract nor allow governments to take steps to change the economic course. The greater
the pressure faced by governments from their European partners, the more their
internal legitimacy is likely to be undermined.
This would not represent a problem for democratic legitimacy if a mechanism of legit-
imation were to connect the implementation and – whenever necessary – the re-nego-
tiation of the common rules back to a source of popular authorisation (either domestic
or supranational). In such a case, both the rules and their ongoing consequences would
be drawn back into a legitimacy-producing mechanism of popular will. But inter-state
agreements have been negotiated so as to commit member states to rules that severely
limit national sovereignty with regard to key domestic policies, while there is no demo-
cratic supranational source of legitimation in place to deal with the political and economic
consequences of the rules’ implementation. When an international agreement impinges
on the competencies of national governments such that it poses severe limitations to
the exercise of national autonomy, it seems reasonable that the criteria used to evaluate
the legitimacy of such an agreement will resemble those that apply to the exercise of
national political authority.
If the EMU is to meet the normative expectations of democratic constituencies, which
are both the addressees of justification and the entities that authorise the functioning of
the relevant institutions, it requires ‘public’ justification –that is, justification that appeals to
all (Morgan, 2005, p. 33) and is discussed in a way that includes all who are subject to the
institutions in question (Habermas, 1996, p. III, 3).
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Paths towards new governance of the EMU
Despite the need to approximate the democratic form of justification for the EMU, we
need to acknowledge the reasons for its having been set up as an international treaty –
an obvious consequence of which is the intergovernmental structure of decision-
making. European peoples are already organised into political communities with their
own traditions and identities. They have their own economic interests and participate in
the EMU in order to enhance their own well-being. Political debate still takes place by
and large at the national level and focuses on national concerns and aspirations. Mechan-
isms of political legitimacy are likewise still national. The kind of consensus to be achieved
among EMU partners must therefore take into account the preferences and long-term
choices that different national democratic constituencies have made through the
decades (i.e. what Habermas calls the ‘values’ of a historical society) (1996, p. 300). More-
over, the common rules impact differently on different countries because of the disparities
among, and peculiarities of, participating members states. The idea that whatever decision
is made must reflect a compromise among the partners must therefore be taken seriously.
To a certain extent, EMU politics is and will remain a matter of international politics. In an
international context, convenors must be able to reach a fair compromise between the
values (and the material interests) at stake – and such a compromise is necessarily differ-
ent from the kind of consensus that must be possible among citizens of a democratic
constituency.
Nevertheless, since inflation targets, public debt and deficit targets, unemployment
rates, poverty, and access to fundamental welfare services all depend to a certain
extent on the implementation of the common rules, common decision-making requires
a form of legitimation that is stronger than that which a purely intergovernmental
process can achieve: a form of legitimation akin to that practiced in national democracies,
and which allows the European peoples to restore, at the level of common decision-
making, the sovereignty that their governments forsook when they subjected their
choices to the common rules.
In sum, what is needed is a model of governance that:
(1) Allows for the co-ordination of national budgets so as to prevent free riding on other
members’ fiscal stability.
(2) Ensures the means to obtain compliance from member states.
(3) Allows participants to bring to bear their preferences as to the right balance between
rigour and public spending, in order to account for their different preferences on the
ways to achieve growth and fiscal stability.
(4) Grants the European peoples, who bear the consequences of collective
decision-making, a level of communicative participation sufficient to allow them to
effectively represent their interests and bring them to bear during the decision-
making process, and to express their consent to, or dissent from, the decisions
being made.
(5) Allows for debate that is sufficiently inclusive and decision-making that is sufficiently
participative, such that the interests brought to bear are demonstrably generalisable
and not strictly particular, that is, merely national.
(6) Rules out ‘absolute losers’ and permanent (national) minorities.
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(7) Compels participants to look for a balanced result that includes one another’s legiti-
mate interests as a condition for decision-making.
(8) Includes in the collective decision-making process the policies on whose implemen-
tation the common rules more directly impact at the national level, such as those con-
cerning unemployment and access to fundamental welfare services.
In light of the current level of political conflict and mistrust in Europe, at the level of
both public opinion and government, it seems vain, if not outright delusional, to expect
deep reform of the EMU. From 2011 onwards, however, both the Commission and the
Council set forth several drafts in this regard, making reasonable certain considerations
about the steps that seem apt both for enhancing the political legitimacy of the EMU
and for achieving the political values that the Union claims to acknowledge.
(A) Re-politicising the rules
In order to adjust to the consequences of the implementation of the common rules and
the changing global economic and financial environment, these rules, and in particular
the timing of their implementation, ought to be periodically rediscussed and renegotiated,
including the short- and medium-term deficit-to-debt ratio and the pace at which the
debt-to-GDP ratio ought to be reduced (for those countries that need to reduce it). Just
as national parliaments periodically discuss budgetary laws, and governments suggest
policies for growth and employment goals (or even inflation goals, as in the UK), so
there ought to be a legislative process to establish similar objectives for the EMU.
(B) Including welfare and employment parameters in the GSP
In order to restore at the EMU level some of the competencies that national governments
inevitably lose whenever they have a hard time abiding by budgetary rules, a number of
common standards of poverty reduction, unemployment, and access to fundamental ser-
vices (such as health) could be included in the ‘convergence criteria’ of the Growth and
Stability Pact. Such standards would serve as a further component in the determination
of the pace at which budgetary adjustment should be implemented for EMU member
states. This idea is not new to the debate in Europe. Indeed, the integration of labour
markets, the coordination of welfare mechanisms, the harmonisation of educational
systems, workers’ representation, etc., as well as fiscal coordination and common budget-
ary measures (i.e. transfers among member states) meant to amend the consequences of
economic imbalances, were all evoked from the inception of the EMU onwards (Arfara,
2012; Buiter, Corsetti, & Roubini, 1993; De Grauwe, 1996; Feldstein, 1992, 2010; Lintner,
2000/2007; Moravcsik, 2012). This highlights the widely acknowledged fact that the
EMU is unthinkable without a substantial transfer of sovereignty in economic matters –
a transfer that has indeed already happened, although national governments and parlia-
ments maintain a formal grip on their respective countries’ economic levers.
It is worth noting that the need to converge on standards that are not purely budgetary
would remain even if the rules of the Pact were to be steadily or temporarily softened,
which is currently the most debated issue at the EU political level, and as is now the
case in the evaluation of the deficit-to-GDP ratio and the debt-to-GDP reduction ratio
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(European Commission (2012)). Indeed, in a number of communications concerning poss-
ible steps towards EMU reform, even the European Commission has acknowledged the
importance of the inclusion of social standards in the evaluation of economic policies
(European Commission 2013a; 2013b).
‘Flexibility’, now eagerly discussed, is apt for alleviating the costs of convergence but
will not overcome the legitimacy deficit (and it is highly doubtful that it actually fosters
economic growth). As shown above, the Pact has been elaborated in order to impose
on governments a politics of re-adjustment, so that national societies can improve com-
petitiveness by means of internal devaluation and continued austerity measures. The
rules determine the pace at which this is meant to happen, not the fact that it must be
done. Therefore, restrictions on national welfare and the scope of national autonomy in
determining politics against unemployment, poverty, access to fundamental welfare ser-
vices – in short, the substantial curtailment of a government’s ability to intervene on
national well-being – will remain (unless the rules are softened such as to make them
fully ineffective), as will distributional conflicts among EMU partners. The current struggle
for the application of the rules of the Growth and Stability Pact is therefore apt for securing
temporary relief for those governments (and nations) that currently find themselves under
greater pressure to re-adjust, but it is not apt for solving the overall legitimacy problem. As
for the current structure of EMU governance, EMU partners are condemned to negotiate
the application of the common rules under conditions of continued political tension
among nations – a condition that was by and large predicted well in advance (Feldstein,
1997, p. 61). There is thus an urgent need to complement the Growth and Stability Pact
with standards that reflect the interest of European peoples in preserving, furthering,
and maintaining democratic control over their own well-being.
(C) Getting the European Parliament involved
Decisions about these policy objectives could be made by means of a revised ordinary leg-
islative procedure.12 Recently, the EP argued along these lines – albeit to a more limited
extent – in the resolution of 24 June 2015, in which it claims that the convergence pro-
grammes containing the financial and reform priorities for EMU member states ought
to be subject to the co-decision procedure in order to increase their democratic
legitimacy.13
Some technical changes to the ordinary legislative procedure are needed, first and fore-
most with regards to its duration.14 Further changes could improve the democratic legiti-
macy of the EP as a representative of the European people: its composition is
disproportional, and the Parliament indeed represents the European ‘peoples’ – not a
European ‘people’ (which patently does not exist, even though a representation of Euro-
pean citizens in general might be necessary for the EMU to outgrow its mercantilist stage;
see Costa, 2001). The still differing electoral mechanisms in the various member states and
the ongoing national dimension of European elections must also be addressed, although
the successful attempt during the 2014 electoral campaign to forge international alliances
under the umbrella of common candidates for the Presidency of the Commission is a
promising sign that European elections might acquire a more markedly supranational
character in the future.
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To be sure, national interests still play an important role in the proceedings of the EP,
especially as regards the Committees.15 However, increasing political discipline within pol-
itical groups (Smith, 1995, p. 72), the formation of predictable minorities and majorities –
along classical ideological boundaries – and the tendency towards bipartisanship among
the twomajor groups (seemingly a consequence of the rules of the co-decision procedure)
(Kreppel, 2002, p. 124) recommend the substantive inclusion of the EP in decision-making
on macroeconomic policies.16 This speaks in favour of the presence of a predictable pol-
itical (instead of simply national) divide in the EP, which would strengthen the EP’s ability
to offer a supranational political arena in which macroeconomic policies can be discussed
in a way that moves beyond national interests. Moreover, although inter-group
cooperation seems easier in some policy areas than others (such as labour-related
issues) (Kreppel, 2002, p. 170), the two major groups in the EP are evidently capable of
mediating between different positions in order to find a commonly acceptable and insti-
tutionally viable solution.
(D) Involving national parliaments
As mentioned above, the current intergovernmental approach to the EMU becomes more
plausible once we consider that member states already have their own macroeconomic
‘traditions’, their own stabilised ‘preferences’ concerning rigour and public spending,
inflation rates, etc., and their own long-term ‘preferences’ on public welfare. It is unlikely
that the peoples of Europe will be ready to transfer sovereignty to the supranational level
and to forsake their own macroeconomic and welfare paths – at least for the foreseeable
future. The ordinary legislative procedure grants the EP and the Council equal weight in
determining the final outcome of legislation, with the Council acting as a second
chamber in which governments, and therefore the economic and social interests of
member states, are represented. And yet, despite the desirability of strengthening the
communitarian level of political debate on macroeconomic and welfare policies, decisions
in this regard cannot plausibly be delegated to the ordinary legislative procedure
altogether. The deeper involvement of national parliaments could help preserve a reason-
able degree of popular control, transparency, and publicity in a way that does not impair
EU decision-making. The reinforced inter-parliamentary cooperation currently promoted
by the EP could be used to implement an ongoing exchange of opinions between national
parliaments and the EP, both ex-ante and in the course of the legislative process.17
However, in order to preserve the (reasonable) influence of national electorates on Euro-
pean decision-making processes, the involvement of national parliaments could be
brought in line with the idea of a qualified ‘blocking coalition’ with regard to decisions
made about the relevant rules at the EU level.
(E) Redistributing the costs of convergence?
The implementation of social standards in the convergence criteria can be undertaken
either via national budgets (i.e. by means of ‘flexibility’) or via a common European
budget (i.e. through intra-European transfers).
The first option is currently being discussed at a scholarly level, with important sugges-
tions coming from inside the Commission.18 It consists in discounting social expenditures
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from the calculus of the macroeconomic convergence criteria on the basis of an EU-wide
benchmarking of social and employment standards. Speaking in favour of this kind of pro-
posal is the fact that it does not imply a transfer union and might therefore be acceptable
even to those governments and public opinions that are less prone to integrating
elements of mutuality into the EMU. What speaks against it is the fact that it does not con-
tribute much to smoothing out the edges of the process of convergence, although it eases
short-term pressure on public budgets.
The second, politically more interesting and economically more sensible option
involves precisely those elements of risk sharing and pooling (in the direction of a more
proper transfer union) that most governments seem to reject, and therefore appears
less politically viable. It is nevertheless interesting to the extent that it could possibly
prompt a ‘convergence of economic interests’ among EMU partners, thus helping to
promote the search for a ‘supranational European interest’ and precluding free riding: if
the ‘costs of convergence’ that any fellow citizen has to bear in order for his/her
country to comply with the common rules are in the end to a certain extent also mine,
I will have an incentive to look for rules that coincide with my fellow citizens’ legitimate
interests and needs, and that therefore more equally distribute the costs and benefits
of that same convergence.
Several suggestions have already been made in this respect. The most widely discussed
model envisages a mechanism of fiscal transfer inside the Eurozone in the form of a kind of
unemployment insurance; it aims to uphold aggregate demand, prevent pro-cyclical fiscal
policies, and reduce uncertainty regarding countries’ financial solvency in case of a down-
turn in the economic cycle (Andor, 2014; Dullien, 2014). Unemployment insurance of this
sort would also reduce cyclical divergence among the national economies of participating
countries to the extent that it would contribute to limiting regional booms and downturns
(Dullien, 2013).19 Beyond technical debates on the specifics of this kind of insurance – con-
cerning for instance its financing base (DG Employment, 2013; Pisani-Ferry, Vihriälä, &
Wolff, 2013), its ‘triggers’ (i.e. the economic conditions that would set off the transfers)
(Beblavý & Maselli, 2014; Dolls, Fuest, Neumann, & Peichl, 2015), and its precise interaction
with national insurance schemes (Beblavý & Maselli, 2014; Depla, 2012) – there looms a key
political question as to its net re-distributional effect: should it be a transfer mechanism, or
should its net effect be nil in the medium term? Studies show that in both cases such a
mechanism would have beneficial effects on the overall convergence process.
Equally controversial, however, is its dampening effect on macroeconomic divergence,
for this would seem to require a shift in how members conceive of macroeconomic con-
vergence: from a purely economic process in which national virtues are glorified and
national vices scorned to a political process of mutual cooperation grounded in a basis
of fairness. In any case, decisions on these matters must comply with the standards of pol-
itical legitimacy depicted above.
Conclusion
Beyond the widely discussed technical deficiencies of the common currency, there lies a
political misstep: the EMU has been conceived in such a way as to leave economic
relations among member states – and thus also differences in relative political weight –
unaltered. Thus the EMU was bound from the start to acquire a combative rather than a
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cooperative character. In the context of this conception of the EMU, it is obvious that pol-
itical legitimacy was not an issue. In times of economic hardship, which have been exacer-
bated by the rules of the EMU, the political economy of the weaker member state is
sacrificed on the altar of the uncooperative logic of the monetary union. Two traditional
gaps reinforce this original sin (or political ill will) in the structure of the EMU: the
concern for preventing free riding in the absence of a central rule-enforcement authority,
and the fact that the domestic dimension of democracy in Europe compels political actors
to spell out European arrangements in terms of national visions and interests. All this has
caused decision-makers to fall prey to a largely inflexible attitude in the conflict over dis-
tribution of the costs of convergence among EMU partners.
Because the EMU is designed to bind partners to a definite set of rules, it necessarily
takes key decisions out of the hands of national institutions. At the same time, it does
not provide for a similarly legitimate decision-making mechanism at the EU or EMU
level, and is therefore unable (and its members unwilling) to compensate for the loss of
democratic control on key national policies. Instead of making the EMU an instrument
of collective, Europe-wide economic self-determination through mutual cooperation,
Eurozone countries are split between lenders and borrowers, exporters and importers,
debtors and creditors. In its current form, the EMU strengthens the power gap between
partners who face each other in the dubious double role of putative cooperator and de
facto unequal competitor.
Considering the limitations that European rules impose on national economic and
social policies, and in the interest of restoring democratic self-determination, the EMU
ought to shift from the kind of justification that is appropriate to a largely intergovernmen-
tal model of governance based on international treaties to that which is appropriate to a
democratic system. A model of governance is needed that: (1) prevents free riding on
certain members’ fiscal stability; (2) ensures the means to obtain compliance from
member states; (3) allows participants to bring their preferences to bear in terms of funda-
mental macroeconomic choices; (4) secures for European peoples a level of communica-
tive participation similar to that enjoyed in national democracies; (5) structures decision-
making so as to allow for the formation of an interest that is both generalisable (in Haber-
masian terms) and not purely national; (6) rules out ‘absolute losers’ and permanent
(national) minorities; (7) ‘compels’ participants to look for balanced results that coincide
with one another’s legitimate interests; and (8) preserves sovereignty on social policies
at the European level even where sovereignty is eroded by the common rules at the
national level.
A possible (although presently unlikely) implementation of the above criteria consists in
‘re-politicising’ the rules, that is, feeding them into a political process, such as the ordinary
legislative procedure, aimed at periodically determining the macroeconomic objectives of
the Eurozone (or the Union as a whole). Alongside such objectives, common social policy
objectives – including welfare and employment objectives – could also be discussed and
subject to common decision-making. Considering the paramount role played by national
democracies both as loci of democratic self-determination and in implementing and spe-
cifying macro-economic and social policies and traditions on the European stage, the
inclusion of national parliaments in more than a consultative capacity should be taken
into account – for instance in the form of a ‘blocking coalition’ of national parliaments.
Finally, mechanisms that allow for the pooling of the risks and burdens inherent in the
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convergence process – and thus for true convergence at the level of economic interest –
can achieve the double effect of smoothing out the edges of the economic cycle and
strengthening the cooperative will of Europe’s governments.
Notes
1. See Wickens (2010) for a detailed analysis.
2. In fact, it is even doubtful that price and wage flexibility plays such a key role in the absorption
of asymmetric shocks. Labour mobility might play a major role instead (Blanchard & Katz,
1992). If this is true, a currency union will only be possible given consistent inter-European
labour mobility.
3. As a matter of fact, several scholars have given timely warnings to the effect that this would be
the most likely outcome of the EMU as it has been conceived and implemented (see for
instance Buiter et al., 1993; De Grauwe, 1996).
4. It is indeed doubtful whether they do now, even after the recent governance reforms. See
Scharpf (2013, p. 16–17) for a thorough analysis.
5. See Eurostat (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=
en&pcode=teina225&plugin=1).
6. https://data.oecd.org/trade/current-account-balance.htm.
7. Portugal’s former Prime Minister, Passos Coelho, brought this to the foreground when at a
conference organized by the daily Diário Económico on 25 October 2011 he made clear
that his country’s way out of the crisis consisted straightforwardly in ‘getting poorer’.
8. Busch has aptly characterised the EMU as a ‘system of competing states’ (Wettbewerbsstaa-
ten) (Busch, 2009, p. 8).
9. See Abreu et al. (2013, p. 34–39) for a more detailed analysis.
10. For a brief overview of the lax application of the EMU common rules, see Wyplosz (2011, p. 21).
11. For an overview of the debate on the EU democratic deficit prior to the euro, see Bellamy and
Castiglione (2000, p. 66–68).
12. Modifications would be required first and foremost insofar as rejection by the Parliament on
second reading cannot be an option. Modifications regarding the role of the Commission in
the legislative procedure could be taken into account, especially in the case of conciliation.
13. For an alternative vision, see Busch (2012, p. 40), who recommends a ‘supranational, elected
economic government’ for the Eurozone in which a reformed EP, elected on the basis of the
equal weight of all voters, would act as one chamber, while states would be represented in the
Council as a second chamber. Busch’s model does without the involvement of national parlia-
ments and reserves for the Commission the role of ‘determining the direction of members
states’ budgetary policy’.
14. The bulk of the procedures undertaken during the seventh parliamentary term took no less
than 17 months (http://epthinktank.eu/2014/11/26/european-parliament-facts-and-figures/
ep-facts-and-figures-fig-19/).
15. National interests weigh deeply on the EP. For instance, national delegations might be over-
represented in committees when the impact of those committees on their own countries’
legislation is particularly relevant. Conversely, committee members often tend to represent
the orientations of their own national delegations. In more general terms, the dimensions
of a national delegation have a relevant impact on a political group’s overall orientation (Whi-
taker, 2011, p. Ch. 4, 7). Moreover, MEPs are inclined to follow the indications of their own
national groups whenever those groups’ positions conflict with their political groups at the
EP, although this seldom occurs. In fact, party cohesion has increased over time, and voting
behaviour usually follows the left-right distinction (Hix, Noury, & Roland, 2007). See also De
Angelis (2013).
16. Indeed, similar suggestions have already been proposed at the institutional level, although in
a different context (van Rompuy, 2012, p. 16, 2013, p. 13; European Commission 2012: 35;
Junker, 2015, p. 17).
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17. See in particular the EP ‘Resolution of 16 April 2014 on relations between the European Parlia-
ment and the national parliaments’ (2013/2185(INI)).
18. See European Commission (2013b). The key idea is to scale up the Employment and the Social
Protection Performance Monitors into a scoreboard of indicators – analogous to the MIP score-
board (Regulation (EU) 1176/2011) – to evaluate member states’ social performances.
19. A mechanism addressing cyclical divergences more specifically has been proposed by Ender-
lein, Guttenberg, and Spiess (2013).
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